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FOREWORD
The authors of this monograph have exposed a key piece
of the puzzle which helps to provide a better understanding
of North Korea’s surreptitious international behavior. For
years, North Korea’s military provocations have been
obvious to the world, however, much of its decisionmaking
is shrouded in secrecy, particularly that of a wide-range of
clandestine activities. This monograph is unique in the way
that it sheds light on the illicit activities of the regime, and
how those illegal activities are used to support its military
programs and the government itself.
From drug trafficking to counterfeiting, from money
laundering to cigarette smuggling, North Korea’s Central
Committee Bureau 39 is an active participant in the criminal
economy of the region with tentacles extending well beyond
Asia. The authors discuss how these activities have negative
strategic consequences for a number of stakeholders and
nations throughout the region while describing how such
activities provide critical funding streams for military
programs and regime supporters.
As a result, North Korea is not just a “rogue state,” but
practices what is essentially criminal sovereignty whereby
it organizes its illegitimate activities behind the shield
of non-intervention while using the tools of the state to
perpetrate these schemes abroad. The authors argue that
this arrangement has important links to succession issues
within the regime. They also argue that policy makers who
are concerned with the development of future policies and
strategies aimed toward North Korea must view those new
policies from a different perspective than that used in the
past.

		

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
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SUMMARY
North Korea’s criminal conduct—smuggling, trafficking, and counterfeiting—is well known, but
the organization directing it is understudied or
overlooked. Policymakers, military leaders, and
scholars may feel that they have a reasonable grasp
on how and why North Korea is actively involved
in criminal enterprises. However, unlike the other
remaining communist states “orphaned” after the
Cold War, or ordinary corrupt autocratic regimes,
or criminally linked warlords and insurgent groups,
North Korea practices a form of “criminal sovereignty”
that is unique in the contemporary international
security arena. North Korea uses state sovereignty to
protect itself from external interference in its domestic
affairs while dedicating a portion of its government to
carrying out illicit international activities in defiance of
international law and the domestic laws of numerous
other nations. The proceeds of these activities are then
used in a number of ways to sustain North Korea’s
existence and to enable other policies. For example,
criminal proceeds are distributed to members of
the North Korean elite (including senior officers of
the armed forces); are used to support Kim Jong-il’s
personal life style; and are invested in its military
apparatus.
The authors of this monograph focus on North
Korea’s Office #39 as the state apparatus that directs
illicit activities to include the manufacture and
distribution of illegal drugs, the counterfeiting of U.S.
currency, and the manufacture and distribution of
counterfeit cigarettes. Finally, as Kim Jong-Il becomes
more frail, the authors assess how his successor may
continue or alter Office #39’s activities.
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CRIMINAL SOVEREIGNTY:
UNDERSTANDING NORTH KOREA’S
ILLICIT INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES
North Korea’s leadership is able to persistently
ratchet up tensions in the region due to its ability to
gain funding from a vast array of illicit international
enterprises organized by a part of its government
known as Central Committee Bureau 39 (also known
as Office #39) of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP).
This shadowy part of an already opaque government
is only briefly mentioned in the analysis of North
Korea’s international behavior or foreign policy. North
Korea’s criminal conduct—smuggling, trafficking, and
counterfeiting—is well known, but the organization
directing it is understudied or overlooked. The authors
of this monograph (two of whom have worked for the
U.S. Government in roles directly scrutinizing North
Korea’s behavior) have relied on interviews with
defectors, congressional testimony from aid workers
working within the country, and press reports from
around Asia to fill this void. Shedding some light on
the nature and activities of Office #39 is essential in
developing appropriate responses to an increasingly
bellicose regime that is threatening regional stability.
Policymakers, military leaders, and scholars may
feel that they have a reasonable grasp on how and
why North Korea is actively involved in criminal enterprises. North Korea’s criminal schemes could be
considered as a response to the demise of the Soviet
Union, one of the regime’s key benefactors. In 1990, the
Soviet Union informed North Korea that any future
imports would have to be paid for in hard currency
(at the world price), and requested repayment of
Pyongyang’s $4 billion in debt.1 After all, the other
remaining communist regimes of Cuba, Vietnam, Laos,
1

and China each have very well developed and active
criminal syndicates that operate across a number of
borders. But none of these communist hold-outs directs
a portion of their government to engage in criminal acts
as a matter of regime survival. Furthermore, Office #39
was started in 1974, well before the end of the Cold
War.
North Korea may appear to have the familiar
outlines of a typical corrupt autocratic regime, but it
is different. It is unlike other autocratic states whose
leaders turn a blind eye to criminal acts within their
own territory, preside over a bloated bureaucracy
to accrue bribes and kickbacks, or receive a cut from
the profits of domestic organized crime groups.
“Unlike Latin America or Europe, where organized
crime attempts to penetrate the state, North Korea is
penetrating organized crime.”2 The crimes organized
by Office #39 are committed beyond the borders of
North Korea by the regime itself, not solely for the
personal enrichment of the leadership, but to prop up
its armed forces and to fund its military programs.
In this way, North Korea may be compared to cases
of warlord criminality as practiced in countries like
Sierra Leone, Liberia, Congo, Sudan, and Myanmar
(Burma), or criminally financed insurgent groups
like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC), or the Taliban in Afghanistan. These groups
also engage in wide ranging illegal activities to keep
themselves viable in a hostile strategic and operational
environment. In fact, North Korea sees itself as being
surrounded by enemies who are bent on eliminating
it.3 Once again, however, North Korea is different. It is
a nation-state; Kim Jong-il is not a warlord, nor is the
KWP or Office #39 an insurgent group. To commit its
criminal acts, Office #39 uses the powers and resources
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of a nation-state—merchant and military vessels,
diplomatic and embassy posts, as well as state run
companies and collective farms—that nonstate groups
do not possess.
Unlike the other remaining communist states
“orphaned” after the Cold War, or ordinary corrupt
autocratic regimes, or criminally linked warlords
and insurgent groups, North Korea practices a form
of “criminal sovereignty” that is unique in the contemporary international security arena. North Korea
uses state sovereignty to protect itself from external
interference in its domestic affairs while dedicating a
portion of its government and the KWP to carrying out
illicit international activities in defiance of international
law and the domestic laws of numerous other nations.
Criminal sovereignty means that rather than the
Weberian notion of the state maintaining the monopoly on the legitimate use of force, the state, in the
case of North Korea, maintains the monopoly on the
conduct of illicit activities. Furthermore, unlike other
states that use their national instruments of power
of diplomacy, law enforcement, and military force to
combat international crimes, North Korea directs its
national instruments of power to commit crimes in
other states. The proceeds of these activities are then
used in a number of ways to sustain North Korea’s
existence and to enable other policies. For example,
criminal proceeds are distributed to members of the
North Korean elite (including senior officers of the
armed forces); they support Kim Jong-il’s personal life
style; and are invested in its military apparatus. North
Korea is, as others have called it, a “Soprano State.”4
Such unique international behavior requires a
more meaningful examination of Office #39’s origins,
organizational structure, and activities in order to
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develop a more calibrated strategy and policy to meet
the North Korean challenge. This monograph will
focus on Office #39’s key illicit activities—to include
manufacture and distribution of illegal drugs, the
counterfeiting of U.S. currency, and the manufacture
and distribution of counterfeit cigarettes. Finally, as
Kim Jong-Il becomes more frail, the need to assess
how his successor may continue or alter Office #39’s
activities grows more acute and will also be examined.
ORIGINS AND ACTIVITIES OF OFFICE #39
The emergence of criminal sovereignty began in
the 1970s when the North Korean leadership realized
it needed to increase the amount of funds coming in
to support the government beyond the huge Soviet
subsidies it was receiving at the time. Thus, reportedly
in 1974, North Korea took action to establish an office to
alleviate this problem.5 To make criminal sovereignty
functional, Office #39 was created as a departmentlevel organization within the KWP Secretariat
under the KWP Central Committee. The office was
established for the explicit purpose of running illegal
activities to generate currency for the North Korean
government. Office #39 generated a slush fund under
the exclusive guidance of Kim Il-sung’s son—who
later became the leader of North Korea—Kim Jongil.6 This also points to a key aspect of this program. It
has been under the supervision and guidance of the
younger Kim since its founding (and long before his
father began to gradually hand over other elements
of the government to his son before the elder Kim’s
death in 1994).7 Office #39, also known as “the
keeper of Kim’s cashbox,” lies completely outside the
jurisdiction of the North Korean Government’s cabinet
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and is separated from the cabinet’s national economic
planning process.8 The headquarters for Office #39 sits
in downtown Pyongyang, not far from Kim Jong-il’s
official office building, and very close to the Koryo
Hotel—which is often frequented by foreign tourists.
Through its offices in Pyongyang, it operates through
government and KWP-run front companies such as
Daesung Chongguk (which has been known to have
offices in Austria), and Zokwang Trading Company
(which has an office in Macao). All of the many front
companies in the web that runs North Korea’s diverse
illicit activities answer directly to the building in
Pyongyang that houses Office #39. This Office, in turn,
answers directly to Kim Jong-il, who is known to often
oversee the actual disbursement of funds derived from
its many activities.9
In the past, Macao was one of the key operating
centers for the companies that answer to Office #39,
and was often seen as the center overseas point. In
Macao, dozens of North Korean “merchants” holding
diplomatic passports ran the nerve center for many of
North Korea’s operations in East Asia and other areas
of the world for several years—keeping what worked
out to be a de facto consulate running from the small
island city. The diplomatic status of the North Koreans,
combined with Macao’s lax banking laws, made
it relatively easy to literally launder suitcase loads
of counterfeit money, or money earned from drug
operations (among others) through banks in the former
colony of Portugal. Pyongyang has also reportedly
used these banks to deposit and/or exchange currency
used in missile deals and other deals relating to
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) projects that
North Korea has proliferated in recent years.10

5

As shown in Figure 1, Office #39 sits at the top of
a maze of operations, encompassing the party, the
military, and an even hazier group of entities such as
government backed front companies. Sometimes these
front companies answer directly to other offices in
the government or the KWP (who eventually answer
to Office #39), and sometimes they answer to either
military or party organizations.

Source: John Park, “North Korea, Inc.: Gaining Insights into Regime
Stability in North Korea From Recent Commercial Activities,”
United States Institute of Peace Working Paper, Washington, DC:
United States Institute of Peace, 2009.

Figure 1. North Korea’s Legal, Illegal, and Illicit
Activities Network.
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Kim Jong-il reportedly maintains a slush fund from
these activities worth billions of dollars, and has used
banks in Macao and banks in Switzerland (among
others) in the past, to hide funds that can be used for
whatever purpose is designated as being for the good
of the people. Interviews conducted by reporters from
the Wall Street Journal with intelligence officials in East
Asia produced estimates that the slush fund generated
by Office #39 amounted to hard currency in the
vicinity of $5 billion.11 Recent pressure from the U.S.
Government on banks in Macao (beginning in 2005),
and publicity regarding holdings in Switzerland, may
have caused a number of the secret bank accounts to
be moved to banks in Luxembourg.12 During August
2006, other reports surfaced alleging Pyongyang had
moved some of its monetary accounts to a bank in
Singapore.13 Events initiated by the U.S. Treasury
Department caused Macao’s banking regulators to
freeze $25 million worth of North Korean accounts in
the Banco Delta Asia, the most notable of the “Macao
Connections” that the U.S. Government had singled
out. Press reports indicated that Zokwang Trading
Company, the primary front company for illicit
activities centered in Macao, closed its headquarters
on the fifth floor of an office building near Banco Delta
Asia. Reportedly, most of its personnel have relocated
to Zhuhai, just across the border in China proper.14
An analysis of the network that exists for North
Korea’s illicit activities shows that a plethora of front
companies under the auspices of Office #39 have
become the important moneymaking operation that is
not only used for an illegal slush fund, but to sponsor
a wide variety of actions the government and the KWP
in Pyongyang would otherwise be too short of funds
to accomplish. The line of control runs from Kim Jong-
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il, to the front companies, to the activities that they
carry out, and then back to Kim Jong-il as the profits
from these activities roll in. As the next section will
demonstrate, this KWP operation has been ongoing
since the mid-1970s (but has apparently increased in
scope in the past 10 years), and its complexity shows
that the North Korean regime is not only effective in
conducting these activities through front companies
and banks willing to launder their money, but they are
also effective at keeping their operations covert.
Drug Trafficking.
Drug trafficking by Office #39 is another aspect of
criminal sovereignty because it plays to North Korea’s
distinct advantages as a nation-state. While organized
crime and terrorist and insurgent groups involved in
drug trafficking must contend with circumventing
state authority and avoiding interdiction at each
node of the trafficking network, North Korea grows,
manufactures, processes, warehouses, and transports
drugs freely. North Korean refugees describe the
country as a “narco-state in which all aspects of the
drugs operation—from school children toiling in
poppy fields to government-owned processing plants
to state-owned cargo ships and trading companies—
are controlled by Kim [Jong-Il].”15 In short, there is
no government to circumvent; in fact, the state itself
actively participates in all levels of drug production
within the country. “State collective farms and youth
brigades [are] used to produce opium to earn hard
currency. Villages had to meet production targets, and
the military helped with distribution.”16 According
to North Korean defector Kim Young-il, North Korea
began its illicit drug production in earnest during the
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late 1970s, and opium produced on farms is sent to
pharmaceutical plants in the Nanam area of Chongjin
in Hamkyong Bukto Province where it is processed
into heroin.17 International aid workers assisting North
Korea during its famine in the 1990s reveal the level of
state penetration in heroin production.
We could not figure out why farmers that I interviewed said they had a third of their land in their villages not farmed. There is a certain Korean word they
used, “Pomyong.” Recently, we learned that the term
in North Korea means the land is put aside for poppy
production. They shrewdly substituted a word for
“fallow land” for poppy production. So it is actually
state-managed, state-run, and there is an allocation
made in state farms for actually producing poppy. It is
not illegal. It is encouraged.18
State-supported drug production, however, is not
for domestic consumption. The major narcotics that
North Korea produces are heroin and methamphetamine, which are exported around the region and
around the globe. North Korea must still circumvent
international law and domestic laws of other
countries to turn a profit. Once again, North Korea
is able to leverage its powers as a nation-state to aid
circumvention. Office #39 facilitates the international
distribution of narcotics by using national assets such
as military and commercial vessels for transportation,
diplomatic personnel to sell to wholesale markets,
and state-owned businesses to launder the profits to
escape seizure. The depth and scope of North Korea’s
trafficking capabilities can be seen in the examples of
interdiction that have occurred over the years.
Much of the drug transportation to the wholesale
drug markets run by underworld groups is done with
North Korean ocean-going vessels. North Korean
ships have been known to rendezvous with Japanese
9

vessels in North Korean territorial waters to transfer
narcotics. However, North Korean military vessels
have ventured in other territorial waters to conduct
drug drops. In 2001, the Japanese Coast Guard and
a North Korean ship exchanged fire, resulting in the
sinking of the North Korean naval vessel that was
operated by North Korean special forces. Japanese
authorities subsequently determined that the North
Korean ship entered Japanese waters to deliver methamphetamines to Japanese Yakuza members.19 In the
following year, Taiwanese authorities stopped and
searched a Taiwanese fishing trawler which contained
174 pounds of heroin that it had received from a North
Korean gunboat.20 In 2003, Australian police arrested
three men in a coastal village west of Melbourne who
had received $50 million of street-ready heroin from
a dinghy launched by the state owned North Korean
ship, Pong Su, which lay just off shore. North Korea
has used its merchant fleet to act as a middleman for
other groups involved in drug trafficking by bartering
other goods, such as weapons, in exchange for drugs.
A North Korean vessel laden with small arms was
detained by authorities in Myanmar who believed that
local insurgent groups were intent on trading heroin
for the arms.21
North Korea has also used its diplomatic corps to aid
the transport of drugs directly to wholesale markets that
lie in specific countries. This was particularly evident
in the 1990s, but stretches as far back as the 1970s. In
1977, after only 3 years of diplomatic ties, Venezuela
expelled all North Korean diplomats for trafficking
drugs.22 In 1996, Russia arrested a North Korean envoy
with 50 pounds of heroin in his possession.23 In 1998,
Egyptian police arrested a North Korean diplomat who
was attempting to smuggle 500,000 tabs of rohypnol

10

(also known as the “date rape drug”) into Egypt
while Russian authorities arrested two North Korean
diplomats in possession of 35 kilograms of cocaine.24
Later the same year, German police arrested the North
Korean deputy ambassador who possessed heroin that
was believed to be manufactured in North Korea, and
Chinese authorities arrested a North Korean consulate
employee with 9 kilograms of opium.25
However, with the exposure of its use of diplomatic
personnel for distribution of drugs to the wholesale
market, North Korea was forced to adapt by outsourcing this portion of drug trafficking to organized
criminal groups such as the Yakuza.26 Once again,
North Korea was able to take advantage of its power
as a nation-state.
For criminal organizations, a state partner offers a
steady supply of high quality drugs, escape from the
inefficiencies associated with avoiding enforcement,
and resources exceeding those of a typical nonstate
group. For North Korea, this arrangement balances
risk reduction with satisfactory profit, capitalizing
on the state’s competitive advantage in creating an
enforcement-free production environment, eliminating competition over distribution, and obtaining cover
of plausible deniability.27
Such partnering with organized crime has reduced
North Korea’s exposure to interdiction efforts, and
has led several countries like the United States, China,
and Russia to focus on how to trace and intercept the
regime’s proceeds. North Korea’s ties to organized
crime in Asia, and elsewhere, appear to be both
diverse and extensive. They have reportedly engaged
in sophisticated drug drops at sea with the Yakuza
from Japan (using Special Operations Forces).28 North
Korean drug smuggling has also been linked to the
Russian Mafiya and other organizations in Europe
11

and Southeast Asia.29 Pyongyang has even been
establishing links with Taiwanese organized crime
syndicates—reportedly inviting members to North
Korea for meetings.30
Receiving and laundering the proceeds of drug
trafficking has largely been done through foreign
banks in China, Switzerland, and Luxembourg. However, North Korean banks, namely Banco Delta Asia,
have been at the forefront. The Macao branch of the
bank has faced ever growing scrutiny by the international community and tighter controls by Chinese
authorities. As previously discussed, $25 million of the
bank’s assets in Macao were frozen in 2005, and more
stringent requirements for opening of new accounts
appear to be taking their toll.31 In an effort to avoid
further scrutiny and tighter controls, it appears that
Office #39 has once again turned to North Korea’s
diplomatic corps. In February 2006, North Korean
diplomats were caught smuggling $1 million and 200
million yen in cash into Mongolia.32
Counterfeit Currency Operations.
North Korea’s long history of illegal drug
manufacture and sales all over Asia has now become
fairly well known. But until recent years, one of its
other sources of hard currency for Kim Jong-il’s slush
fund was not as well known—counterfeit currency. Part
of the 2005 action undertaken by the U.S. Government
against banks in Macao was to staunch Office #39’s
laundering of counterfeit United States $100 bills.33 The
U.S. Secret Service has said on several occasions that
the North Korean-manufactured counterfeit U.S. $100
bills currently in circulation are the most sophisticated
in the world (thus leading to their widely used
nickname—”Supernotes”).34
12

North Korea’s counterfeit currency operations are
extremely sophisticated and run by skilled experts.
According to press reports, high-tech equipment from
Japan was acquired to manufacture the bills, as well as
paper from Hong Kong and ink from France. By 1989,
millions of dollars of this fake American currency was
being distributed worldwide. It is probably important
to point out at this point that North Korea is the
only government in the world known to be running
a counterfeit money operation as a matter of state
policy.35 The North Korean counterfeit distribution
network includes diplomats, Chinese gangsters,
organized crime syndicates in Asia and elsewhere
(possibly Russia), banks (especially in Macao), and
criminals associated with the Irish Republican Army.36
Defectors alleged in 2005 that a factory in the city of
Pyeongseong prints the counterfeit $100 bills—and
this assessment was also supported by recent travelers
to North Korea and China. According to press reports,
the bills have often been exchanged with Chinese
merchants at 50 percent of their value and then mixed
in with real bills.37
North Korean intelligence services have reportedly
used the Supernotes to finance activities overseas,
and even for foreign purchases made on behalf of
Kim Jong-il. The counterfeit U.S. banknotes were
discovered in Manila, the Philippines, in 1989, and
months later were also unearthed in Belgrade, Serbia.
The bills have also surfaced in a diverse set of places
such as Ethiopia, Peru, Germany, and once again,
Macao.38 The bills have even surfaced in Lebanon’s
Bekka Valley.39 According to Yonhap, the semi-official
information arm of the South Korean government,
the number of bogus U.S. bills detected in the country
has increased since 2005—again mostly in $100 bills,
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and again, likely from North Korea.40 The Supernotes
have even surfaced in Las Vegas, Nevada—reportedly
first during 2005. In 2007 a Chinese businessman was
arrested there who was apparently using the casinos
to help launder the bills that he had acquired from
the North Koreans. The bills have also been linked to
North Korea’s WMD proliferation—as reportedly they
are sometimes used in transactions.41
In 2006, a 3-month investigation by the Chinese
government, of accusations that North Korea was using
banks in Macao to launder counterfeit profits, confirmed suspicions raised by the U.S. Government. South
Korean diplomats revealed to the press that Chinese
officials had expressed their concerns regarding the
counterfeiting of U.S. currency to a North Korean
delegation during a visit to Beijing, China, by Kim
Kye-kwan (a highly placed North Korean diplomat
holding the title of Vice Foreign Minister).42 North
Korean counterfeit U.S. bank notes reportedly surfaced
in Hong Kong during February 2006.43 In what was
probably an indicator of concern in Beijing, in March
2006, the Peoples Bank of China issued a directive to
financial institutions to “increase vigilance” against
fake $100 bills.44
Counterfeit Cigarettes.
North Korea’s illicit and illegal drug production
and marketing, and its counterfeiting of American currency, have been the focus of attention in recent years;
but another aspect of Pyongyang’s illicit activities is
also highly profitable—counterfeit cigarettes. Because
of the nature of the product, counterfeit cigarettes are
easily exportable through both front companies and
legal shipping means. In fact, counterfeit cigarettes
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may be North Korea’s largest and most profitable
container export. Large tobacco corporations based
in the United States, Japan, and South Korea used
private investigations to identify factories in North
Korea producing counterfeit cigarettes and have
worked with officials from both their own countries
and others in the region to stop the distribution of the
contraband. The overhead for the smuggling of these
“fake” cigarettes is very low. According to former
State Department official David Asher, a standard 40foot container full of counterfeit cigarettes may cost as
little as $70,000 to produce but have a street value of $3
to $4 million. These operations apparently picked up
in scope and focus almost from the beginning of the
Kim Jong-il regime. An example is the 1995 incident,
that the Associated Press reported, when authorities in
Taiwan seized 20 containers on a ship bound for North
Korea that were full of counterfeit cigarette wrappers
that at the time would have rendered a street value of
up to $1 billion in cigarettes.45
Defector testimony has revealed that there are
counterfeit cigarette factories that are located in
several areas in North Korea—all, of course, off limits
to foreigners. According to Park Syung-je of the
Korean Military Analysts Association, at least one
of these factories reportedly produces nothing but
counterfeit Marlboro cigarettes. Park explains that
the individuals who work in the counterfeit cigarette
factories reportedly belong to a special work force
team, which entitles them to extra rations—clearly
a group that receives much better treatment than
the rank-and-file within North Korean society. In an
interview conducted recently, Park also explained
how several defectors had reported another factory
located in the outskirts of Pyongyang that produces
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counterfeit “Seven” brand cigarettes, one of the most
well-known and popular cigarettes consumed legally
in South Korea. Of interest, defector reporting indicates
the distribution and marketing of counterfeit cigarettes
involves networks in other countries, that then enable
the cigarettes to be sold throughout Asia. At least some
of these networks are reportedly also involved in the
distribution of illegal drugs.46
According to congressional testimony from State
Department official Peter A. Prahar, between 2002 and
2005, counterfeit Marlboro cigarettes were identified in
more than 1,300 incidents in the United States. Federal
indictments filed in 2006 allege that for several years
criminal gangs have arranged for one 40-foot container
of North Korea-sourced counterfeit cigarettes per
month to enter the United States for illicit sale. Reports
from private investigators working abroad on behalf
of tobacco corporations state North Korean counterfeit
Marlboro cigarettes and other brands are also being
sold on a large scale to several countries in the Far
East, including Japan and Singapore. As with the sale
of illegal drugs, it appears that in the sale of counterfeit
cigarettes, the North Koreans are collaborating with
Chinese organized crime networks (and likely other
networks in the Far East).47 Japanese and South
Korean press reports have cited officials who stated
that intelligence data from satellites and Japanese
maritime police officials shows North Korea routinely
transferred counterfeit cigarettes onto foreign ships
registered in Cambodia, Mongolia, and Taiwan. The
reports indicated that the cigarettes were counterfeits
of American, Japanese, and British tobacco brands.
The reports also indicate that due to the size, scope,
and relatively low overhead, Pyongyang is possibly
drawing in higher profits from counterfeit cigarettes
than from other illicit activities.48
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THE EFFECTS OF 39’S ACTIVITIES
Beyond propping up the North Korean regime
and funneling money to its military programs, Office
#39’s activities create a number of wide-ranging
negative effects around the region while undermining
international peace and stability. The effects created
by these crimes represent another strategic dimension
of threats emanating from North Korea. While most of
the world is focused on the country’s nuclear weapons
and related military programs, the criminal acts
perpetrated by the regime represent security threats
in their own right. Even if the regime were not using
these criminal enterprises as a means to contribute to its
longevity and to enhance its military capabilities, they
would still be viewed as threats that would require a
response.
The prolongation of intrastate violence in parts
of Asia is an effect of North Korea’s drug trafficking.
This is most noticeable in the case of Myanmar. North
Korea’s capacity as a nation-state to facilitate drug
running and the acquisition of weapons means that it
possesses competitive advantages that the Myanmar
guerrillas and Asian organized crime syndicates do
not. Insurgent groups in Myanmar produce heroin
and methamphetamine for the next node in the trafficking chain, namely the middleman who pays them.
As seen with the “guns for drugs” incident, groups in
Myanmar do not earn their profits from street sales,
but from the middleman that has been, in certain
instances, North Korea. Acting as a middleman for
Myanmar’s guerrillas, North Korea has aided and
abetted the ongoing stalemate between certain rebel
groups and the government of Myanmar. With arms,
and the money to buy arms, these insurgent groups
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are still able to hold large swathes of territory beyond
the central authority of Rangoon. The perpetuation
of violence has also led to human rights abuses like
the forced recruitment of children soldiers by these
guerrilla groups.
North Korea’s activities also undermine social
stability in a number of other countries through its
contacts with violent nonstate actors. For example,
Office #39 colluded with Sean Garland, an Official
Irish Republican Army head, and leader of the Irish
Workers’ Party, to run a ring that distributed
Supernotes in Belarus, the Czech Republic, Denmark,
Great Britain, Ireland, Poland, and Russia.49 The
total proceeds from the ring were estimated to be
$28 million. As previously discussed, North Korea
also enables organized criminal syndicates like the
Japanese Yakuza, Russian Mafiya, and Chinese Triads,
to deepen their penetration into illegal markets and
erode civil society in their home countries, and in other
countries where they operate. It is also believed that
North Korea offers safe haven to organized criminal
syndicates who provide their expertise to Office #39
and commit crimes in their home countries from the
security of a sovereign state.50
The growth of poppy crops in North Korea
undermines subsistence agriculture in the country and
contributes to its recurring famines. These famines
have been routinely used by the regime to seek more
international humanitarian aid. In some respects,
this aid acts as a subsidy for the North Korea opium
industry because valuable crop space is not being
used to grow food crops. This lack of agricultural
development means that the regime cannot rely on
the farming sector to generate income for the domestic
or export markets, leading to the need to secure hard
currency in other more nefarious ways.
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North Korea’s drug trafficking also contributes to
the deterioration of public health in countries where
its product is sold. In Japan, it is estimated that somewhere between 40 to 67 percent of methamphetamine
comes from North Korea, and has contributed to the
rise in the numbers of addicts seeking treatment and
rehabilitation.51 Rising rates of “meth” addiction in
Hawaii have also been the result of Korean organized
crime groups who have been linked to the North
Korean regime.52
Money laundering and counterfeiting present
another set of problems. Such activities undermine
legitimate financial institutions and the legal economies
of a number of states. Because the proceeds earned by
Office #39 are derived from illicit transactions, they
must be concealed in a variety of ways to avoid detection. This involves invoice and licensing fraud, bribery
of customs officials, creation of shell companies, and
the use of underground or illegal remittance systems.
Such wide-ranging involvement means that there are
numerous other stakeholders in the activities of Office
#39 beyond the regime itself. Citizens and officials
from countries like Japan, South Korea, China, Russia,
Australia, the United States, Malaysia, Singapore,
Taiwan, and Egypt have been swept up in the vortex
of North Korea’s criminal schemes, contributing to
crime rates and, in some cases, the steady erosion of
state authority.
Although criminal schemes do represent an
additional strategic dimension of threats, of critical
concern is the long-standing and ongoing existence
of the networks for conducting the illicit activities
that Office #39 has put in place. These networks are
adaptive, resilient, covert, and widespread; they
could be put to use for the transfer of nuclear material
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from North Korea to other dangerous regimes or to
violent nonstate actors. North Korean Vice Minister
Kim Kye-gwan warned, “[The United States] should
consider the danger that we could transfer nuclear
weapons to terrorists, that we have the ability to do
so.”53 Even if North Korea does not directly give nuclear weapons or material to a terrorist group, the states
that seek nuclear weapons—Iran and Syria—also
have money and oil, which the regime needs. In these
states, “it would be a short step from the government
to some of the sponsored terror groups.” 54
OFFICE #39 AND KIM REGIME SUCCESSION
Criminal sovereignty as conceived and practiced
by North Korea is likely to survive the current rule of
Kim Jong-il. The “who” that will succeed Kim Jongil will make a difference to the control of Office #39
and the continuation of criminal sovereignty. That
“who”—whether a single individual, a regency that
will nurture one of Kim Jong-il’s sons, or an oligarchic
structure such as the members of the National Defense
Commission—will require leadership of those resources that enable control of the military, the KWP,
and the internal security apparatus. Keeping these
key pieces loyal means control of significant financial
assets that Office #39 has been adept at acquiring.
Kim Jong-il’s apparent stroke during the summer
of 200855 demonstrated that Kim’s personal rule
is nearing its end, and leaves many international
leaders and Asian policy analysts wondering who will
eventually succeed Kim.56 Certainly the consequences
of that succession process are justification for concern,
given North Korea’s toxic mixture of economic and
social instability and significant military capabilities,
including WMD and its ballistic missile arsenal.
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Though information about the inner circle
leadership is not easy to come by, there are functions
within the Kim Regime that one can assess as being
consistent with any totalitarian dictatorship57—the
control of the economy is not the least important
for those who rule by force. Central to Kim Jong-il’s
ability to maintain the financial underpinnings of his
totalitarian regime is his creation of a “court economy,”
akin to that practiced by an absolute monarch.58 Started
in 1972, this court economy predates the emergence of
Office #39 but is one of the many drivers of criminal
sovereignty. The court economy is responsible for
approximately 30 to 40 percent of North Korea’s entire
economy and is also referred to in a number of other
ways, such as the Supreme Leader’s economy, the 3rd
economy, the elites’ economy, the cadre economy, or
the party (KWP) economy.59 The functional heart of
this court economy is now, in fact, Office #39.60
As discussed earlier, Office #39 has some of its
roots in the previous succession process. In preparation for his succession to his father, Kim Il-sung, Kim
the younger began a glorification project of his father’s
rule; this required funding. After being appointed
by his father in September 1973 to the two KWP
posts of Secretary of the Organization and Guidance
Department (OGD), and Secretary of the Propaganda
and Agitation Department, Kim Jong-il realized that he
needed more effective funding mechanisms to support
the regime leadership and his own succession process.
Consequently, in 1974 Kim established Office #39 as a
separate department within the KWP Secretariat, thus
giving Office #39 significant authority. Kim Jong-il
has maintained direct supervision over Office #39
since then, while tasking it with the mission of earning foreign currency to fund regime maintenance.61
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This includes overseeing all of North Korea’s foreign
transactions;62 providing funds for Kim Jong-il’s
personal use;63 and providing for luxury goods that
Kim Jong-il uses to reward the regime’s military,
government, and party elite;64 as well as the needs of
the regime security agencies.65 Just as importantly, and
more critically for the ongoing Six Party Talks and U.S.
policy on North Korea, at least a portion of the foreign
currency funds that Office #39 generates for Kim Jongil go to investing in North Korea’s nuclear and missile
programs.66
The 10 departments in Office #39 specialize in all
types of material goods, giving the next North Korean
leader(s) access to specialized transactions in support
of his/their activities, especially important during the
power consolidation phase after Kim Jong-il’s death.
In support of these activities, and organizationally
subordinate to the Daesung General Bureau, are the
Daesung Bank, the Kyunghung Guidance Bureau, the
Nakwon Guidance Bureau, the Kumgang Guidance
Bureau, and the Daehung Guidance Bureau.67
Interestingly, the profits from all of these Office #39
elements, as well as those subordinate to other party
and military functions, are only presented (under the
pretext of “revolutionary funds”) in large aggregate
sums to Kim Jong-il on special occasions such as his
birthday on February 12, Kim Il-sung’s birthday on
April 15, New Year’s Day, and other important dates
of the North Korean calendar. Under what pretext and
under what name will these same funds be presented
to the next North Korean leader(s)? Changing this
presentation formula by Office #39 could lead to
complications in the trust factor among the regime
elite, and could seriously jeopardize the financial
underpinnings of the regime.
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One of the natural questions for all regional leaders
and political analysts is: Who will control Office #39
and the foreign currency that makes the Kim Regime
run once Kim Jong-il is dead or no longer capable
of controlling the regime or governing the country?
Considering Office #39’s role in providing financial
support to regime functions, control of it gives Kim
Jong-il’s successor(s) the ability to fund rewards
for the regime elite, significant control over North
Korea’s illicit activities, and at least financial influence
over North Korea’s WMD programs. Such influence
is considerable, considering Office #39’s operating
principles.
There are a number of individuals who are in
positions to control Office #39 after Kim Jong-il is
no longer able to govern or has died. The military
maintains a monopoly on the guns, and the National
Defense Commission is the governing apparatus of
the state. Furthermore, the military elite have their
own trading companies and banks to conduct foreign
currency earnings. But the military elite ultimately
come under the control of the party through the
General Political Bureau, which reports directly to
Kim Jong-il through the very powerful Organization
and Guidance Department. Though Kim Jong-il
has apparently appointed his third son, Kim Jongun, as his heir apparent,68 one individual stands out
distinctly from all others in terms of his widespread
influence within the OGD—Kim Jong-il’s brother-inlaw, Chang Sung-taek.69 Chang is one of four First
Vice-Directors of the OGD, one of four seconds to
Kim Jong-il’s position as OGD Secretary (arguably the
most powerful office Kim uses to control the regime’s
elite). Chang is personally responsible for oversight of
the internal security agencies70 that maintain vigilance
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over the political reliability of every single North
Korean citizen. In addition to his First Vice-Director
position, Chang also supervises the OGD’s Party
Headquarters Department, a position from which
he maintains significant influence over Office #39
personnel. Also, in addition to being a Kim Regime
family member by virtue of his marriage to Kim Jongil’s only full-blooded relative, his sister Kim Kyunghui, Chang was recently appointed to the National
Defense Commission (NDC).71 Though not a military
man, from this position Chang will be able to review
military policy and national-level decisionmaking
within the NDC. From these positions of influence,
Chang should be able to use the significant financial
resources of Office #39 to influence other members of
the NDC (most importantly), and other regime elite,
to ensure either the succession of Kim Jong-il’s third
son by acting as regent, or even move to make himself
leader of North Korea (though the sum efforts of the
other NDC members would likely prevent this). The
resources that Office #39 provides not only gives the
next leader domestic influence, but financially supports at least a portion of North Korea’s WMD
programs—with corresponding influence over foreign
policy.
Whoever leads North Korea next will control
the operations of Office #39 and thus influence the
other regime elite, while maintaining Office #39’s 17
overseas offices, including Moscow, Beijing, Hong
Kong, and Singapore. The next leader will also control
Office #39’s representative offices at every major sea
port and rail junction in North Korea.72 Office #39
also maintains liaison offices in every province, city,
and county in North Korea.73 The next North Korean
leader will also control Office #39’s largest operating
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agency, the Daesung General Bureau, under which are
numerous subordinate trade companies and foreign
exchange banks, all independent of the North Korean
state and ultimately following only the guidance of
Kim Jong-il through the KWP’s Organization and
Guidance Department.74 Whoever succeeds Kim Jongil as the OGD Party Secretary will have control over
all aspects of Office #39, particularly the careers of
every single employee of the bureau.75 Founded on
May 6, 1974, the Daesung General Bureau has grown
so large that Office #39 and all of its subordinate
organizations have become known within North Korea
as the Daesung Conglomerate.76 This conglomerate,
which in many ways is far more influential than,
for example, South Korea’s major conglomerates of
Samsung, Hyundai, and Daewoo, and which is tasked
by Kim Jong-il with providing every kind of goods—
industrial, agricultural, marine, and technical, both
domestic and foreign, and both through legitimate and
illicit venues—has numerous trading companies and
exchange banks that the next North Korean leader(s)
can use to conduct its foreign currency earnings
overseas and domestically.
RECOMMENDATIONS
How can criminal sovereignty as practiced by
North Korea be confronted? It is important to underscore that North Korea is not an ordinary nation-state
that uses sovereignty to protect its citizens, conducts
benign relations with other nation-states, or sees criminal activities as corrosive to the international order.
For North Korea, sovereignty is used to shield the
regime from intrusive acts that may compromise its
externally directed criminal activities and which are
perpetrated by the organs, institutions, and personnel
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of the government itself. Coming to grips with such a
complex state requires multifaceted approaches.
• Do not view illegal activities as contingent
upon North Korea’s military ambitions. North
Korea would likely continue its criminal
enterprises even in the event of successful
nuclear disarmament. The North Korean elite,
including senior members of the military, need
hard currency to continue to maintain their
power. Because this organization was not only
established by the current leader of North Korea,
but also proven to be extremely profitable for
its duration, it is likely that Kim Jong-il will be
extremely hesitant to dismantle the programs
that come under its umbrella.
• Sanctions on North Korea can create pain for
the regime, but they will not force an end to
the country’s criminal schemes. Sanctions were
aimed at gaining North Korean concessions
at the nuclear negotiating table. They were
not aimed at stopping the regime’s criminal
conduct. In fact, the United States unfroze
North Korean assets gained from criminal acts
as a way to make progress on the prospects for
nuclear disarmament and after North Korea
promised to use the money for humanitarian
purposes.
• Crackdowns during 2005-07 by the U.S.
Treasury Department on front companies and
banks either owned by the North Koreans or
used by them (that were conducting illegal
activities) apparently caused significant damage
to Pyongyang’s illicit economic networks.
Recent resumption of these crackdowns may
again threaten the viability of these networks—
and can be enhanced by cooperation from allies.
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• North Korea should not be described as a nationstate that is simply misbehaving. North Korea
engages in criminality not as a matter of choice,
but of necessity. Its reliance on illicit activities is
not likely to be eased by offering inducements
or increasing sanctions. Real change in behavior
can only happen from the top, and an analysis
of the succession process indicates that those
who succeed Kim Jong-il are unlikely to cease
Pyongyang’s illicit activities.
• States in the region should work to strengthen
law enforcement cooperation. The Proliferation
Security Initiative has made important strides in
this direction, but it is mainly directed towards
North Korea’s arms trade. Because of the wide
ranging nature of Office #39’s crimes and
their effects, law enforcement from a number
of countries should establish “fusion centers”
dedicated specifically to tracking North Korean
illicit activities.
• Expand United Nations (UN) Security Council
Resolution 1874. Following North Korea’s longrange ballistic missile test and underground
nuclear test in 2009, the UN Security Council
issued sanctions that targeted not only
North Korean financial institutions, but key
individuals associated with nuclear, ballistic
missile, and other WMD-related programs or
activities. This can and should be expanded
to include front companies and individuals
engaged in counterfeiting, drug trafficking,
money laundering, and other illicit activities
that support the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea (DPRK) regime and pose a threat to the
national security of nations in the region and
elsewhere.
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CONCLUSION
Criminal sovereignty is an unusual practice in
international relations. North Korea has been practicing it for decades; it is unlikely that it can be successfully ended in the short term. North Korea has proven
to be creative at adapting state power for criminal
purposes that are directed externally for the purposes
of regime survival and military progress. Criminal
sovereignty may still take a number of new forms in
the future. Office #39’s activities have evolved and
continue to do so, meaning that policymakers should
exercise ever more vigilance in analyzing, assessing,
and challenging North Korea’s behavior.
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